Challenger Disaster and Communication

D.A. Windsor's article on the failure of communication in regards to the Challenger disaster examines how the engineers and managers did not communicate effectively. In one of the beginning paragraphs Windsor defines communication as the ability to reach a common interpretation. Both engineers and managers read the same the data and reached entirely different conclusions. In the caucus before the launch all the engineers were against the launch and all the managers were for it. But R.K. Lund was against it and then when asked to "take off his 'engineering hat'" he changed his position and agreed to go ahead with the launch. I wonder how he could be against it and then for it? If he interpreted the data one way to agreed with the engineers, how could he make a 180 and then interpret the data to contradict his original conclusion?

Bad news is part of life. In science, I would think that bad news would be better accepted than in other fields. If something doesn't work, it doesn't work. The engineers didn't get the message across strong enough but the managers didn't believe what they were told. Was the contract with NASA so much more important than the lives of the Challenger crew? When lives are at stake, I think there should be even more conservatism in continuing on with the launch than ever.

Finally, there seemed not to be a consensus among the engineers that something needed to be said until the very end--right before the launch. The memos varied in degree of severity and information. Some were confusing and others used emotional appeals to get the message across. If the engineers would have formed a unified front they may have been more successful in obtaining effective communication by convincing the managers that there was a big problem with the O-rings.